Tras replantear en un marco cognitivo e interpersonal algunas cuestiones fregeanas, proponemos: I. Para aquéllos cuyo conocimiento desborda al del hablante, el enunciado tendría sólo sentido. II. El nombre que funciona como sujeto del enunciado tendría igualmente sólo sentido, porque es para el hablante una visión ajena, una visión incompleta o incorrecta, que por ello requiere ser transformada por el predicado. III. Ni al nombre ni a ninguna palabra puede asignársele referencia: las palabras son categorías sintácticas, no correlatos de parcelas (...) de la realidad. La referencia tradicionalmente atribuida al nombre no es realmente de éste, sino del enunciado. (shrink)

Both metarepresentation and cultural learning have an identical origin. The imitation of new and complex motor patterns (also articulatory-phonetic patterns) is a crucial skill not only because it enables cultural transmission but also because its high requisites give rise to the exclusively human mind. The premotor plan at the base of such imitation requires the ability to fictionalize bodily postures, which implies a second line of awareness. Only by means of this second line can the human being deal with situations (...) different from his own real and current situation. This permanent double cognitive architecture explains finger-pointing, laughing, and also all capacities considered metarepresentational. Evocation and metabeliefs (these latter being the starting point of syntax) result in language formation. There are two operating modes of the double line, which starting respectively with motor learning and finger-pointing, give rise to pretence and metabelief, and whose distinct nature can also account for the difference between fictionally triggered emotions and morality. (shrink)